Η έγκαιρη διπλή παρέμβαση της Εύας Καϊλή για ευρωπαϊκά ομόλογα ειδικού σκοπού αλλά και επέκταση του ισολογισμού της ΕΚΤ, χτίζει τη βάση, έτσι ώστε να στηριχθούν οι μικρομεσαίες επιχειρήσεις με παροχή εγγυήσεων και μηδενικό επιτόκιο, ασκώντας έτσι την μέγιστη πίεση από τους Ευρωβουλευτές προς το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο.
Σε επιστολή της προς τους προέδρους του Συμβουλίου, της Επιτροπής, της Ευρω-ομάδας και της ΕΚΤ, η Ελληνίδα Ευρωβουλευτής, πέρα από τη δική της προσπάθεια, επιχείρησε να υποστηρίξει στο μέγιστο και τους αρχηγούς των εννέα κυβερνήσεων της ΕΕ που ζήτησαν τη δημιουργία ευρωπαϊκού ομολόγου στο Συμβούλιο, κινητοποιώντας μια μεγάλη μερίδα Ευρωβουλευτών διακομματικά και διακρατικά.
Είναι κρίσιμο να δημιουργηθεί ένα ευρωπαϊκό ομόλογο τώρα, προκειμένου να δημιουργηθεί ένα σχήμα αμοιβαιοποίησης του χρέους που δημιουργούν αυτούς τους μήνες οι χώρες με αφορμή την πανδημία covid19, προκειμένου να περιοριστεί η έκθεσή τους σε δημοσιονομικούς κινδύνους και να αποτραπεί ένας νέος γύρος ύφεσης και δημοσιονομικών μέτρων εις βάρος λίγων χωρών μετά τη κρίση.
Στο ίδιο πλαίσιο η Ελληνίδα Ευρωβουλευτής με δεύτερη παρέμβαση της στην ΕΚΤ ανέδειξε την ανάγκη υποστήριξης όχι μόνο του τραπεζικού συστήματος αλλά και των μικρών και μεσαίων επιχειρήσεων, κατευθείαν με εγγυήσεις και με δανεισμό μηδενικού επιτοκίου. Η λογική του προτεινόμενου οικονομικού μέτρου είναι να μειωθούν οι τριβές που προκαλούνται από τις διαδικασίες των τραπεζών, και να διαχωριστεί η πιστοληπτική ικανότητα της κάθε επιχείρησης από την πρόσβασή της σε ρευστότητα ώστε να σωθούν θέσεις εργασίας, να μην σταματήσει η ικανότητά τους να χρηματοδοτούν την εισαγωγή πρώτων υλών και να μπορούν να καλύπτουν το βραχυπρόθεσμο χρέος τους χωρίς να μεταφέρουν τις επιπτώσεις αυτές στην αγορά.
Ακολουθούν τα κείμενα των δύο παρεμβάσεων της Εύας Καϊλή:
Επιστολή στους προέδρους του Συμβουλίου, της Eπιτροπής, του Eurogroup, και της ΕΚΤ για την δημιουργία ευρωπαϊκού ομολόγου ειδικού σκοπού.
To:
The President of the Council of the EU,
The President of the European Commission,
The President of the Euro-group,
The President of the ECB
Subject: Approval and Immediate Issuance of an “Emergency Eurobond”
The recent pandemic has shown that no member state can handle alone the crisis response and contain the emergency within its territory. The solution to an emergency that threatens EU, requires immediate, decisive and coordinated action in political, operational and financial level.
Furthermore, the financial burden of an emergency cannot be carried on the shoulders of a few Member States. The financial and economical fingerprint of the consequences of this emergency, as for example the appropriate level of public debt according to the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the fiscal requirements of the primary surpluses, should not inhibit the efforts of the Governments to tame the danger. Also, the macroeconomic consequences of the emergency management should be at the minimum level possible after the end of the emergency.
We definitely welcome the decisions of the Council to neutralize the fiscal impact of the COVID-19 emergency as well as the decision of the Eurogroup to activate the “general escape clause”. However this flexibility, no matter how important it is, it cannot effectively erase the macroeconomic figures after the crisis, especially for Member States facing significant constraints and suffered most from the emergency.
The expansion of liquidity with relaxing of fiscal discipline does not mean that the macroeconomic impact after the crisis will not be heavy in the Member States that suffered more by the emergency.
EU should develop a central capability of financing its special measures and emergency activities and keep the macroeconomic impact of this management, as much as possible, in a collective balance sheet, instead of concentrating the economic consequences on the balance sheets of the Member States – a situation that can only procrastinate the return of those Member States to normal figures in their accounts post crisis.
The only feasible solution to distribute the macroeconomic burden of an emergency is through a scheme of an emergency Eurobond – emphasis on the word emergency to signify the short term horizon of the measure, issued and recorded in the balance sheet of the ECB. Some Member States rejected in the Council the idea of a “corona-virus” bond, replicating economically inefficient, fiscally biased behaviors that exacerbated and deepen the financial crisis back in the 2010 and 2012. It is of paramount importance not to return to those years nor make the same mistakes.
In the same line, mistakes made in the financial crisis in the case of Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus, if replicated for member states of the size of Italy, Spain and France, it will threaten not the viability of the Euroarea but rather the very existence of the Union. We should not allow to make the COVID19 crisis an existential crisis for the EU.
A specific euro-bond issued by the ECB has significant fiscal benefits:
1) it does not endanger but rather ensures the resilience of the Stability and Growth Pact,
2) it minimizes the fiscal and financial burden to the Member States affected more by an emergency (that is not necessary to be financial)
3) it improves the operational agility of the European Institutions, and
4) it consolidates the European solidarity and improves the presence of the EU in the society
Consequently, we urge the European Council, the Commission and the ECB to take immediate action and provide the European Parliament with a plan that will promptly allow the issuance of the emergency Eurobond in support of the Member States fighting COVID-19.
Παρέμβαση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα για την παροχή εγγυήσεων για τη ρευστότητα στις Μικρές και Μεσαίες Επιχειρήσεις
The pandemic of the COVID19 has been escalated into an exogenous macroeconomic shock that burdens disproportionally the small and medium enterprises, distorts their cash flows, threatens job places, and challenges their viability in the post-crisis period.
Immediate liquidity needs need to be covered with debt instruments. These instruments, no matter if they become immediately available, their impact on the balance sheet after the crisis will be severe and potentially distorting. This means that the cost of borrowing should be minimal, if not 0%, reflecting the needs of the emergency and not the credit worthiness of the requesting business.
On the other hand, no matter the cost of borrowing, the accumulation of debt will have distorting long-term effect for small businesses. Consequently, a scheme of debt guarantee by ECB of any borrowing request of small and medium enterprises would be of critical importance extending the vitality of a “whatever it takes” policy directly to real sector, especially where the emergency is most acute.
Consequently we ask:
Is the ECB operationally ready to use its balance sheet to protect the SMEs and the real sector directly by the necessary providing debt guarantees?
What actions ECB should take to trickle down this policy to the financial intermediaries of the Member States?
